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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20560 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment imposed for 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony 
of the Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding* 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs, 
ORLANDO F. ROYBAL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20560 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of Issues and Statement of the Case are 
as set forth previously in the Appellant's Brief, The Appellant 
takes this opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) J 
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT 
WAS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN 
FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE, 
The Appellant, Orlando Roybal, argues on appeal that 
the warrantless "frisk" search of him by Officer Robert Mitchell 
violated the Appellant's right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure. In response, the State lists eight separate 
facts which Officer Mitchell allegedly knew about Orlando Roybal, 
in justification of the search (State brief at 7). But, contrary 
to the State's logic, Officer Mitchell's testimony established 
that there was no nexus between this knowledge and the search of 
Mr. Roybal, 
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Officer Mitchell repeatedly testified, under questioning 
from defense counsel, the prosecutor, and Judge Wilkinson, that at 
the time of the frisk Mitchell had no idea that the man he was 
frisking was Orlando Roybal (T. 24,25,41). The State claims 
in its brief that Mr. Roybal identified himself before the frisk 
(State brief at 7-8). But according to the testimony of Officer 
Mitchell, this was not true. Officer Mitchell was adamant that 
he did not know the identity of Mr. Roybal before he frisked Mr. 
Roybal. Officer Mitchell testified that the search was based 
on a "sixth sense" (T. 28). Clearly, Mitchell did not fear 
violence from the man he was frisking (T. 23). 
The State's justification for the frisk was a group 
of facts that Officer Mitchell supposedly knew about Orlando 
Roybal, which, taken in their totality, the State claims to 
amount to the requisite "specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant the intrusion". Terry v. Ohio, 292 U.S. 1 (1968). In 
considering the reasonableness of the warrantless frisk, the 
searching officer's knowledge at the time of the frisk should 
be controlling. The State's argument might have merit had Officer 
Mitchell known before hand that the man he was about to frisk 
was indeed Orlando Roybal. But Officer Mitchell's knowledge 
1 
of facts regarding someone named "orlando Roybal" was irrelevant 
to a consideration of the reasonableness of the frisk of a person 
Mitchell did not know to be Orlando Roybal. As far as Mitchell 
1 
knew at the time of the frisk, the suspect was an unidentified 
stranger. Simply because an unidentified person is in the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vicinity of an earlier wrong-doing is not sufficient reason to 
justify a warrantless frisk. State v.Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 
(Utah 1985). 
Once the irrelevant reasons advanced by the State 
are disregarded, the only justification possibly applicable 
is that Roybal leaned on the police car while talking to Officer 
Mitchell (State brief at 8). But this fact, standing alone, 
does not meet the reasonableness test of United States v. 
Thorpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) as cited by the 
State: 
Evidence that the officer was aware 
of sufficient specific facts as 
would suggest he was in danger 
satisfies the constitutional 
requirement . • . so long as 
it is clear that he was aware 
of specific facts which would - • • • 
warrant a reasonable person to 
believe he was in danger. 
(State brief at 8). It is simply not reasonable to assume that 
someone who leans on a police car while talking to the officer 
inside is armed and presently dangerous. 
In conclusion, the State failed to justify a warrant-
less frisk of the Appellant by Officer Mitchell. Mitchell did 
not know that the man he was frisking was Orlando Roybal. Officer 
Mitchell did not testify as to any specific and articuable facts 
which would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the 
Appellant was armed and presently dangerous. For this reason, 
the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the gun seized 
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in the frisk, and thereby violated the Appellant's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Briefs, 
Orlando F. Roybal seeks reversal of his conviction and remand 
for a new trial or dismissal of the charges against him. 
Respectfully submitted this £f) day of November, 1985 
$• frp*<~ 
R. BROWN 
:torney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief will be delivered 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this pQ day of November, 1985. 
< . & v^g-O 
L W R . BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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